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1. Pragmatism and the Foundations of Probability
1 The debate on the foundations of probability in the first half of the twentieth century is
imbued with ideas that are distinctive of pragmatism. In earlier work, I have emphasized
that  a  number  of  protagonists  of  that  debate,  regardless  of  the  attitude  taken  in
connection with the interpretation of probability, were strongly influenced by pragmatist
philosophers. For example, Rudolf Carnap acknowledged his debt towards Clarence Irving
Lewis, as did Hans Reichenbach and Frank Plumpton Ramsey in connection with Charles
Sanders  Peirce and William James,  while  Bruno de Finetti  identified with the Italian
pragmatists, especially Giovanni Vailati, his source of inspiration. Moreover, Ernest Nagel
claimed to have borrowed the leading idea of his “truth-frequency” theory of probability
from John Dewey.1
2 According  to  a  widespread  opinion,  even  before  the  encounter  between  logical
empiricism and American pragmatism a number of European scientists including Ernst
Mach, Ludwig Boltzmann, Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem, and Karl Pearson, had embraced
a  view  of  science  with  strong  affinities  to  the  pragmatist  outlook.2 Their  influence
extended not only to the above mentioned authors, but also to others such as Richard von
Mises, Janina Hosiasson, Harold Jeffreys, Émile Borel, and Maurice Fréchet, all of whom
took part in the debate on the foundations of probability and heralded a probabilistic
approach to epistemology revolving around the conviction that science, and knowledge
at  large,  are  probabilistic  in  nature,  and  that  knowledge  acquisition  is  obtained
inductively  from  empirical  data.  Of  the  main  interpretations  of  probability,  namely
frequentism, logicism, subjectivism and propensionism, subjectivism is the closest to the
pragmatist perspective first and foremost for the centrality ascribed to man as an agent
acting in the world, and the idea that human action is guided by belief.3 In what follows
attention will be called to the influence of pragmatism, and more in particular European
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pragmatism, on the birth of subjective probability, concentrating on three of its major
representatives in different countries, namely Borel, Ramsey and de Finetti.
3 Before  embarking  on  that  discussion,  it  is  useful  to  highlight  those  aspects  of  the
pragmatist outlook that are more relevant to our present purposes. In a recent paper
called The Spirit of Pragmatism in the Quads of Oxford, David Backhurst identifies five major
components of pragmatism, which can be summarized as follows: (1) a doxastic theory of
truth as that which is deserving of belief; (2) an empiricist account of meaning – the
meaning of an expression resides in its consequences for action; (3) a fallibilist, dynamic,
inquiry centered account of knowledge; (4) an anti-dualistic approach according to which
the distinction between theoretical  and practical  reasoning is  rejected in favour of  a
unified conception of inquiry grounded in scientific method; (5) the primacy of practice
(Backhurst 2017: 77-8). Focusing on the literature on the foundations of probability, the
following tenets, which are obviously in tune with the features described by Backhurst,
play a pivotal role: (1) knowledge is intrinsically probabilistic; (2) prediction is the
primary purpose of science; (3) probability statements acquire meaning in connection
with  their  capability  to  guiding  decision  and  action;  (4)  the  criterion  for  testing
probabilistic  evaluations  and justifying inferential  methods (induction)  is  success;  (5)
scientific truth corresponds to a special sort of belief, and results from consent in the
long  run.  Although one  or  the  other  of  these  statements  is  shared  by  a  number  of
supporters  of  different  interpretations  of  probability,  they  constitute  the  gist  of  the
subjective theory.
 
2. The Subjective Theory
4 Subjectivism  is  the  theory  that  probability  is  the  degree  of  belief  actually  held  by
someone in a state of uncertainty regarding the occurrence of an event. According to this
approach, probability is  a primitive notion endowed with a psychological  foundation,
which requires an operative definition specifying a way of measuring it. A longstanding
method dating back to the seventeenth century is the betting scheme, according to which
the degree of belief corresponds to the odds at which an agent would be willing to bet on
an event whose occurrence is uncertain. The probability of such an event equals the price
to  be  paid  by  the  agent  to  obtain  a  certain  gain  should  the  event  occur.  The  only
requirement to be imposed to degrees of belief is coherence. Put in terms of betting,
coherence ensures that betting ratios are chosen in such a way as to avoid sure loss, or
gain, namely the situation known in the literature as a Dutch book. The strength of the
notion of coherence amounts to the fact that the laws of probability are derivable from its
assumption, or, in other words, coherent degrees of belief satisfy the rules of additive
probabilities. This result, which lies at the core of the subjective theory, was stated for
the first time by Ramsey in 1926, and demonstrated by de Finetti in 1928. Although the
betting scheme is probably the best-known operative method that allows measurement of
degrees of belief, it is by no means the only one; more on this will be said in what follows. 
5 Since they were the first to realize the importance of coherence and its role within the
subjective outlook, Ramsey and de Finetti are reputed to be the “fathers” of subjective
probability. But they were by no means the only ones to embrace a subjective approach to
probability, together with a probabilistic conception of knowledge and science. In the
first half of the twentieth century, the same approach was shared by other authors in
distant  parts  of  Europe,  including  Janina  Hosiasson,4 Émile  Borel,  and  Paul  Lévy.  In
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addition, Harold Jeffreys, albeit embracing the logical theory of probability, heralded a
view of epistemology in many ways close to subjectivism.5
 
3. Frank Ramsey’s Pragmatism
6 Ramsey’s  pragmatism  is  broadly  discussed  in  the  literature,  where  he  is  deemed  a
pragmatist in connection with his conception of meaning, theories and scientific laws.6
His  view of  probability  is just  as  imbued  with  pragmatist  ideas,  as  he  himself
acknowledges  by  referring  to  James,  and  especially  Peirce  on  whose  writings  he
maintains  that  the  final  section  of  Truth  and  Probability is  “almost  entirely  based”
(Ramsey 1990: 90).7 The gist of Ramsey’s pragmatism lies with the centrality of belief as
our guide to action, which goes hand in hand with the stress put on predictive success,
providing the criterion for evaluating probability assessments, and more generally for
justifying induction. As put by Ramsey in Induction: Keynes and Wittgenstein:  “a type of
inference is reasonable or unreasonable according to the relative frequency with which it
leads to truth and falsehood.  Induction is  reasonable because it  produces predictions
which are generally verified, not because of any logical relation between its premisses
and conclusion.” (Ramsey 1991: 301). The pragmatic flavor of this attitude is emphasized
by Ramsey himself,  who notices that “this is a kind of pragmatism: we judge mental
habits by whether they work, i.e. whether the opinions they lead to are for the most part
true, or more often true than those which alternative habits would lead to” (Ramsey 1990:
93). By taking such a stand Ramsey anticipates work by de Finetti, Savage, and subsequent
subjective statisticians who developed a whole family of methods for the validation of
probability assessments, like scoring rules. More on this in Section 4 below.
7 A peculiar trait of Ramsey’s version of subjectivism is his definition of chance – which
represents an important contribution to the subjective theory, surprisingly overlooked by
the  literature.8 Although endowed with  objective  import,  Ramsey’s  notion  of  chance,
together  with  the  related  notion  of  probability  in  physics,  are  framed  within  the
subjective  outlook.  Contrary  to  Norman Campbell’s  definition  of  chance  in  terms  of
frequencies, Ramsey holds that “chances are degrees of belief within a certain system of
beliefs and degrees of belief; not those of any actual person, but in a simplified system to
which those of actual people, especially the speaker, in part approximate” (Ramsey 1990:
104). Such systems of beliefs typically contain empirical regularities. Chances differ from
frequencies because the frequencies actually observed do not necessarily coincide with
them; for instance the chance of a roulette hitting the 0 is the same irrespective of the
fact that yesterday it never hit the 0 for the whole day. Unlike frequencies, chances are
deemed objective in a twofold sense. In the first place, saying that a system includes a
chance value referred to a given phenomenon means that the system itself cannot be
made to include a pair of deterministic laws, ruling the occurrence and non-occurrence of
the same phenomenon. Moreover, chances are objective “in that everyone agrees about
them, as opposed e.g. to odds on horses” (Ramsey 1990: 106). 
8 The related notion of probability in physics is then defined as chance referred to a more
complex  system  which  contains  reference  to  scientific  laws  and  theories.  Physical
probabilities represent ultimate chances, meaning that within the theoretical framework
in which they belong there is no way of replacing them with deterministic laws. The
assessment  of  physical  probabilities,  as  well  as  their  objective  character,  rests  on
scientific theories that are accepted by the scientific community.  These are part of a
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strong  system,  supported  by  a  good  deal  of  evidence  from  experience.  Ultimately,
reference is made to the “true scientific system” which is “uniquely determined” because
“long enough investigation will lead us all to it” (Ramsey 1990: 161). Notably, Ramsey’s
attitude in this connection echoes “Peirce’s notion of truth as what everyone will believe
in the end” (ibid.), as he puts it. A similar conception of truth was shared by James, whom
is often mentioned in Ramsey’s writings.
9 Ramsey  takes  a  constructivist  approach  to  knowledge  centered  on  the  notion  of
reliability. In the note Knowledge, he holds that a belief is knowledge if it is “formed in a
reliable way. We say ‘I know,’ however, whenever we are certain, without reflecting on
reliability. But if we did reflect then we should remain certain if, and only if, we thought
our way reliable.” (Ibid.: 110). A number of clues contained in other notes give an idea of
the  criteria  for  reliability  Ramsey  had  in  mind.  They  include,  in  the  first  place,
experimentation,  which is  crucial  for  the formation of  beliefs  and the assessment of
probabilities. In Ramsey’s words: “Why should one experiment? To increase the weight of
one’s  probabilities.”  (Ibid.:  161).  The  note  called  Statistics calls  attention  to  another
important ingredient, namely statistics whose “significance is in suggesting a theory or
set of chances” (ibid.: 102). Statistics is also the tool to perform causal analysis: “we find
that chances are not what we expect, therefore the die is biased.” (Ibid.: 103). In this way,
knowledge is made to rest on the possibility of establishing a strong link between belief
and success. As described by Nils-Eric Sahlin for Ramsey “a belief is knowledge if it is
obtained by a reliable process and if it always leads to success” (Sahlin 1990: 93).9 
10 That Ramsey’s pragmatism was influenced by Peirce and James has been argued in some
detail  by  a  number  of  authors.10 Less  emphasis  has  been placed on the  influence  of
Poincaré, whose conception of chance was taken into serious consideration by Ramsey, as
shown by a number of mentions in his notes.11 We also know that Ramsey read Mach’s
Analysis of Sensations and it is plausible to conjecture that the ideas spelled out in that
book had an impact on him. Such a conjecture has been made by Sahlin, who considers
Mach “may have had an unforeseen influence on Ramsey” (Sahlin 1990: 125). Note 15 in
Notes  on  Philosophy,  Probability  and  Mathematics,  titled  “On  ‘I  can’,”  in  which  Ramsey
comments on a passage from Mach’s book, points in the same direction. 
 
4. Bruno de Finetti, Radical Probabilist
11 Bruno de Finetti embraced an uncompromising version of subjectivism, which earned
him the epithet “radical probabilist” coined by Richard Jeffrey.12 His probabilism was
influenced in equal measure by the Italian pragmatists Mario Calderoni and Giovanni
Vailati and the scientist-philosophers Ernest Mach and Henri Poincaré. 
12 For  de  Finetti,  pragmatism meant  the  opposite  of  the  “hundred  ways  of  not  saying
anything” (de Finetti 1976: 285)13 common to all philosophical trends from scholasticism
to idealism, except for empiricism. He claims to have “adopted the mode of thinking
advocated by authors like Vailati and Calderoni” because “it was precisely this form of
reasoning which, in successive waves, from Galileo to Einstein, from Heisenberg to Born,
freed  physics  –  and  with  it  the  whole  of  science  and  human thought  –  from those
superstructures of absurd metaphysical dross which had condemned it to endless round
of quibbling about pretentious vacuities” (de Finetti 1975: 41). Similar statements recur
many times  in  de  Finetti’s  writings,  which abound with attacks  on metaphysics  and
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realism, seen as contrary to a view of  science as a product of  human activity aimed
primarily  at  prediction.  In line with the mode of  thinking of  pragmatists,  de  Finetti
rejects the “immutable and necessary” nature of scientific laws, in the conviction that
“the absolute truth does not exist” and therefore “science, understood as the discoverer
of absolute truths, remains idle for lack of absolute truths” (de Finetti 1989: 169). The
refusal of such unrealizable ideals gives way to a deep concern for the applicability of
science. 
13 The application of science, and above all forecast, requires probability. Here, de Finetti
appeals  to  Poincaré  who  “has  clearly  understood  that  only  an  accomplished  fact  is
certain, that science cannot limit itself to theorizing about accomplished facts but must
foresee, that science is not certain, and that what really makes it go is not logic but the
probability calculus” (ibid.: 173). Right in the beginning of his most famous paper, namely
La prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives, containing the text of the lectures he
gave in 1935 at the Institut Henri Poincaré in Paris, de Finetti calls Poincaré “the thinker
who attributed the greatest domain of application to the theory of probability and gave it
a completely essential role in scientific philosophy” (de Finetti 1980a: 59). Moreover, de
Finetti praises Poincaré for “having used psychological analysis to put life back into some
formally arid questions which it is not enough to consider only from the formal point of
view” (de Finetti 1989: 219). The psychological element is obviously crucial for de Finetti,
who advocates the subjective view and defines probability as the degree of belief “as
actually  held  by  someone,  on  the  ground  of  his  whole  knowledge,  experience,
information”  (de  Finetti  1968:  45)  in  the  occurrence  of  an  event  whose  outcome  is
unknown. Probability is a primitive notion defined implicitly by the role it plays with
respect  to  the  decisional  criterion  of  an  individual;  in  other  words  the  meaning  of
probability resides in its being our guide to prediction and action. Also in this regard de
Finetti’s attitude is patently close to pragmatism. 
14 Importantly,  de Finetti  regards  his  own position as  “analogous to  Mach’s  positivism,
where by ‘positive fact’ each of us means only his effective subjective impressions” (de
Finetti 1989: 171). Mach is also mentioned as a source of inspiration in a letter of 1957 to
the  jurist  and  political  scientist  Bruno  Leoni,  in  which  de  Finetti  describes  his  own
viewpoint as close to “scientific criticism (for instance Mach; ‘operational definitions’ in
modern physics,  ‘behaviourism,’  and so on) tracing back to the perspective of Hume,
Berkeley, etc.”14
15 Operationalism is, together with pragmatism and empiricism, a fundamental component
of de Finetti’s perspective, because in order to endow probability with effective import “it
must not be based on vain or over-elaborate phrases, but it must be operative, i.e. based on
the indications given by experiments, albeit conceptual ones, that must be carried out in
order to measure it” (de Finetti 1976: 294). Most influential in that connection was Percy
Bridgman’s The Logic of Modern Physics (1927), which de Finetti read in the German edition
titled Die Logik  der  heutigen Physik (1932),  mentioned many times in his writings.  The
definition of probability in terms of betting quotients is by no means regarded as the only
option by de Finetti,  who in the 1931 paper  Sul  significato  soggettivo  della  probabilità15
introduced an alternative definition based on the qualitative relation “at least as probable
as,” and from the sixties onwards preferred to adopt scoring rules of the Brier kind.
Named after the meteorologist who applied it to weather forecasts, such a rule serves the
twofold  purpose  of  obliging  probability  evaluators  to  be  as  accurate  as  possible  and
improve evaluations, made both by single agents and groups, by providing them with a
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tool apt to enhance “self-control” as well  as “comparative control” (de Finetti  1980b:
1151).16
16 The idea of improving probability evaluation is far from being alien to the subjective
viewpoint, in spite of the widespread misunderstanding whereby subjectivism is some
sort  of  an “anything goes”  approach,  according to  which in  no  way can probability
judgments  can  be  judged  right  or  wrong,  once  coherence  is  satisfied.17 Such  a
misunderstanding has obviously been suggested by de Finetti’s assertion that “probability
does not exist” printed in capital letters in the preface to the English edition of Teoria delle
probabilità.18 De Finetti’s claim has been taken to mean that probability evaluations, as the
expression  of  personal  feelings,  can  be  made  without  taking  into  account  empirical
evidence. On the contrary, the assertion was meant to reject the metaphysical tenet that
probability  is  an  objective  feature  of  phenomena.  However,  while  objecting  to
metaphysics, de Finetti firmly insisted that empirical evidence is an essential ingredient
of  probability  assessment  that  must  not  be  neglected.  He  makes  it  clear  that  the
evaluation of  probability “depends on two components:  (1)  the objective component,
consisting of the evidence of known data and facts; and (2) the subjective component,
consisting  of  the  opinion  concerning  unknown  facts  based  on  known  evidence”  (de
Finetti 1974: 7). The effectiveness of subjective probability as a tool for prediction can and
must be assessed, and the criterion for it is the success of forecasts. As de Finetti puts it:
“though maintaining the subjectivist idea that no fact can prove or disprove belief I find
no difficulty in admitting that any form of comparison between probability evaluations
(of myself, of other people) and actual events may be an element influencing my further
judgment, of the same status as any other kind of information.” (de Finetti 1962: 360). In
other words, de Finetti took very seriously the problem of objectivity, or the “goodness”
of probability evaluations, and actively worked on the topic, partly in collaboration with
Jimmie Savage, pioneering a thriving field of research.19
17 If the emphasis on successful prediction is perfectly in tune with pragmatism, so is de
Finetti’s  result  known  as  the  “representation  theorem,”  which  secures  to  subjective
probability  applicability  to  statistical  inference.  In  brief,  the  representation  theorem
states that the adoption of  the Bayesian method in conjunction with exchangeability
ensures the convergence between degrees of belief and frequencies. Such a convergence
offers the grounds for the reduction of objective to subjective probability, because once it
is made clear how information on frequencies interacts with subjective elements, there is
no need for objective probabilities (chances). The pragmatic meaning of this move has
been stressed by Brian Skyrms, who observes that “de Finetti does not offer a translation
of chance. Rather, he looks at the role that chance plays in standard statistical reasoning,
and  argues  that  that  role  can  be  fulfilled  perfectly  well  without  the  metaphysical
assumption that chances exist” (Skyrms 1984: 12). Furthermore, de Finetti thinks that the
representation theorem answers the problem of induction, because it justifies “why we
are also intuitively inclined to expect that frequency observed in the future will be close
to frequency observed in the past” (de Finetti 1972: 34).  Once again, the argument is
pragmatical,  as  it  is  based  on  the  role  of  induction,  which  amounts  to  guiding  our
reasoning and decision.20 
18 Although de Finetti’s fierce opposition to the notion of chance marks a divergence with
Ramsey’s  subjectivism,  it  must  be  added that  late  in  his  life  de  Finetti  softened his
attitude  somewhat,  admitting  that  probability  evaluations  deriving  from  accepted
scientific theories have a more robust meaning than those not supported by such a strong
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evidence, thereof coming close to Ramsey’s position. Unlike Ramsey, who – as we saw –
developed  the  idea,  de  Finetti  did  not  go  beyond  the  admission  that  probability
evaluations constrained by scientific theories – for instance the distributions belonging to
statistical mechanics – “provide more solid grounds for subjective opinions” (de Finetti
2008: 52).21 To this he adds that “by looking at the outcome of a phenomenon we could be
driven to formulate a rule by virtue of which, in each case, things would blend in that
way, as if  it  were a necessary law of nature” (ibid.).  This claim highlights de Finetti’s
conviction that scientific laws are rules, or instruments for prediction and action; in his
colorful prose: “if one takes science seriously, then one always considers it also as an
instrument. Otherwise, what would it amount to? Building up houses on cards, empty of
any application whatsoever!” (Ibid.: 53). The author’s position regarding scientific laws
and theories goes hand in hand with the conviction that there is a continuity between
science and everyday life. Also in that connection there is a patent affinity between de
Finetti’s position and pragmatism. 
 
5. Émile Borel, Temperate Subjectivist22
19 In  a  review  of  Keynes’s  Treatise  on  Probability (1921)  published  in  1924  in  Revue
philosophique and reprinted as an appendix in the monograph Valeur pratique et philosophie
des probabilités (1939),23 Borel moves a number of objections to Keynes, and outlines a view
of probability that shares some aspects of both subjectivism and pragmatism and is in
various ways influenced by Poincaré. To Borel’s eyes, Keynes overlooked the application
of probability to science, for concentrating on the probability of judgments. Starting from
the consideration that “the probability that an atom of radium will explode tomorrow is,
for the physicist, a constant of the same kind as the density of copper or the atomic
weight of gold. Albeit these constants are always at the mercy of the progress of physical-
chemical theory, they are constants in the present state of science” (Borel 1964: 50), Borel
concludes that probability has a different meaning in different contexts. In particular,
probability  has  a  different  meaning depending on the  body of  information available
within the context in which it occurs. In science, where its assessment is backed by laws
accepted by the scientific community,  probability has a more objective value than in
everyday life, where it can take “different values for different individuals” (ibid.). It is
important  to  clarify  what  “objective”  means  for  Borel.  As  he  puts  it:  “objective
probabilities can be defined as probabilities whose value is the same for a certain number
of individuals who are well informed of the conditions of the aleatory event.” (Borel 1952:
105). In other words, the objectivity of probabilities occurring in science derives from the
theories accepted by the community of scientists, and as such are supported by a good
deal of evidence. The similarity with Ramsey’s notion of objective probability is striking.
Poincaré’s conception of objective chance as having intersubjective character24 is also
likely to have exerted an influence upon Borel’s views on the matter. 
20 As concerns single case probability assignments, Borel maintains that “the probability of
a single case is defined subjectively by the conditions at which an agent is ready to accept
to  bet  on the  occurrence  or  non-occurrence  of  the  event”  (Borel  1952:  105).  In  this
connection he takes sides with subjectivists and mentions de Finetti’s La prévision. The
betting  method  is  taken  to  provide  the  operative  tool  that  allows  probability  to  be
connected with action, since it “can be applied to all verifiable judgments; it allows for a
numerical  evaluation of  probabilities  with a  precision quite  comparable  to  that  with
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which one evaluates prices” (Borel 1964: 57). Bridging the gap between probability and
action is deemed crucial by Borel, who strongly advocates the importance of practice, and
embraces the pragmatist principle that “a proposition has practical interest for men only
insofar as it can exercise an influence on their actions” (1952: 89). 
21 While  borrowing  such  a  principle  from  Reichenbach,25 Borel  makes  it  clear  that
agreement does not extend to the frequency approach, against which he raises a few
objections.  In  particular,  he  criticizes  Reichenbach’s  treatment  of  the  single  case  by
observing that imposing a requirement of homogeneity to the reference class would lead
to considering increasingly narrow classes, ending up with “classes that contain so few
elements  that  the  concept  of  frequency  does  no  longer  apply”  (ibid.:  87).  The  more
detailed is the description of the single case, the more evident the differences with other
instances of the same kind, so that “one will find that probability is defined in a way that
is less and less precise, the better known is the case at hand” (ibid.: 88). 
22 As already observed, Borel takes a subjective approach to the estimation of single case
probabilities, which he reckons crucial in view of practical applications. While endorsing
the subjective approach, he does not overlook the importance of frequencies nor does he
deny that they are a fundamental component of probability evaluation; rather he holds
that in some contexts other elements come into play. To exemplify his position, Borel
invites us to consider the case of a medical doctor who is asked to make a forecast about
the probability of survival of a patient who has contracted a certain disease. The doctor
will consider the relevant statistics of deaths among patients affected by the same illness,
but he is also likely to consider additional information regarded to be relevant to the case
at  hand,  in  the  light  of  his  own  experience.  Like  de  Finetti,  for  Borel  single  case
probability  attributions  result  from  the  concurrence  of  information  on  frequencies,
personal experience and common sense. In a note titled Punti di vista: Émile Borel de Finetti
praises Borel for holding that probability must be referred to the single case and can be
measured sufficiently well  by means of the betting method, but criticizes his eclectic
attitude according to which probability can take an objective as well as a subjective value.
26 As we saw, Borel feels the need to address the issue of defining an objective notion of
probability suitable for application to science, putting forward a solution having some
similarity with Ramsey’s and Poincaré’s. To sum up, Borel’s subjectivism has much in
common with de Finetti’s but is more moderate, mainly due to his tenet that probability
assessments  made  in  the  context  of  disciplines  like  physics,  endowed  with  theories
shared by scientists, have an objective character. However, it must be stressed that his
view of objective probability does not have a realistic import, being rather close to the
pragmatist idea of objectivity as agreement of the scientific community. 
23 Borel’s  commitment  to  the  subjective  interpretation  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a
probabilistic approach to epistemology inspired by the conviction that “probability lays
at the core of scientific knowledge” because “the value of all scientific results can be
assessed only by means of a probability coefficient” (Borel 1952: 10).27 Moreover, “the
theory of probability not only possesses the same practical and philosophical value of all
of other scientific theories; but is the basis of all knowledge” (Borel 1952: 11). The crucial
importance of probability is given by its practical value, which “surpasses that of the rest
of  human  knowledge”  (ibid.:  42).  Borel’s  deep  concern  for  the  practical  value  of
probability is not confined to science, but extends to all aspects of life, including everyday
life, which is regarded on a par with science, in line with the pragmatist perspective. 
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6. Concluding Remarks
24 Although – as already observed – other authors contributed to the birth of subjective
probability, Borel, Ramsey and de Finetti played a key role in its formation. In addition to
the  subjective  approach to  probability,  these  authors  shared a  view of  epistemology
grounded  in  the  conviction  that  science  and  knowledge  in  general  are  deeply
probabilistic in nature. Such a viewpoint is imbued with ideas that are ingrained in the
pragmatist tradition, including the tenet that the main purpose of science is prediction
and success is the canon for the justification of induction; the overall importance ascribed
to practice; and the emphasis on action, regarded as the gist of the meaning and the value
of probability. These ideas were inspired partly by American pragmatists and partly by
European scientist-philosophers like Mach and Poincaré, who were a formidable source of
inspiration for the mathematicians and scientists of their time, including those working
on the foundations of probability. 
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NOTES
1. For more details see Galavotti 2017a.
2. Evidence  that  in  Europe  ideas  close  to  pragmatist  philosophy  were  around  before  the
encounter  with  American  pragmatism has  been disclosed  by  a  number  of  authors  including
Friedrich  Stadler,  Thomas  Uebel,  Donata  Romizi  and  Massimo  Ferrari;  see  their  chapters  in
Pihlström, Stadler & Weidtmann (eds) 2017.
3. More on this is to be found in Galavotti 2011.
4. The reader interested in Hosiasson’s contribution to the philosophy of probability (largely
overlooked by the literature) is addressed to Galavotti 2008. More to be found in Galavotti 2014a,
where the work of Hosiasson, together with that of the other authors discussed here, is located
within a larger European trend in probabilistic epistemology, which anticipated of a few decades
the tendency today predominant in philosophy of science.
5. On Harold Jeffreys’s probabilistic epistemology see Galavotti 2003 and 2005.
6. Ramsey’s  pragmatism  has  been  discussed  among  others  by  Philip  Wiener  1973,  Horace
Standish Thayer 1968, Nils-Eric Sahlin 1990, Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel 2002, Claudine Tiercelin
2004, Cheryl Misak 2016 and 2017.
7. In Galavotti 2011 attention is called to the influence of pragmatism on Ramsey’s conception of
probability.
8. See Galavotti 2005 for a more extensive treatment of Ramsey’s subjectivism, and Galavotti 1995
and 1999 for more on his notion of chance.
9. Ramsey’s constructivism is dealt with in some detail in Galavotti 2014b.
10. See footnote 6.
11. See Ramsey’s note “Chance” and notes 67 and 69, which is titled “Poincaré’s Essay on Chance
in Science and Method,” in Ramsey 1991.
12. See Jeffrey 1992.
13. De Finetti refers to the title of an essay by Calderoni and Vailati which appeared in 1909 – for
the English translation see Calderoni & Vailati 2009.
14. Quoted from document BD 10-13-27 of the “Bruno de Finetti Collection,” with the permission
of the University of Pittsburgh. All rights reserved.
15. English edition in de Finetti 1992.
16. See Dawid & Galavotti 2009 for more details.
17. For a rebuttal of such misunderstanding see Galavotti 2018.
18. See de Finetti 1975.
19. For more details see Dawid & Galavotti 2009.
20. See Galavotti 1989 for a more extensive treatment of the connections between de Finetti’s
anti-realism, operationalism and pragmatism.
21. The  quotation  is  from  Philosophical  Lectures  on  Probability,  which  contains  the  English
translation of a series of lectures delivered by de Finetti in 1979, see de Finetti 2008.
22. Some passages of this section are borrowed from Galavotti 2017b.
23. The  monograph  is  the  last  one  of  a  series  of  eighteen  forming  the  Traité  du  calcul  des
probabilités et ses applications, published between 1925 and 1939. For the English version of Borel’s
review of Keynes’s Treatise see Borel 1964.
24. On this issue see Romizi 2017.
25. Borel refers to Reichenbach 1937.
26. See de Finetti 1939.
27. See  also  Borel  2014  where  the  author  addresses  the  “sophism  of  the  heap  of  wheat”
suggesting a way out of it based on probability.
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ABSTRACTS
Pragmatism, taken not just as a philosophical movement but as a way of addressing problems,
strongly influenced the debate on the foundations of  probability  during the first  half  of  the
twentieth  century.  Upholders  of  different  interpretations  of  probability  such  as  Hans
Reichenbach, Ernest Nagel, Rudolf Carnap, Frank Ramsey, and Bruno de Finetti, acknowledged
their debt towards pragmatist philosophers,  including Charles Sanders Peirce,  William James,
Clarence Irving Lewis, William Dewey and Giovanni Vailati. In addition, scientist-philosophers
like  Ernst  Mach,  Ludwig  Boltzmann,  Henri  Poincaré,  Pierre  Duhem,  and  Karl  Pearson,  who
heralded a conception of science and knowledge at large that was close to pragmatism, were very
influential  in  that  debate.  Among  the  main  interpretations  of  probability  –  frequentism,
propensionism, logicism and subjectivism -, the latter is no doubt the closest to the pragmatist
outlook. This paper concentrates on three representatives of the subjective theory, namely Frank
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